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 J. S. Mill regards individuality as the most fundamental of human interests – the 
principal condition of and main ingredient in self-development. But in addition to 
the individualist-functionalist element in Mill’s thought there is also a strong 
element of fallibilism derived from an empiricist view of the nature and possibilities 
of human knowledge. A corollary of Mill’s fallibilism is his conception of human 
nature as essentially open and incomplete. His doctrine of individuality and self-
development, on the other hand, implies that the individual is definable by certain 
necessary and permanent characteristics. Following a discussion of the empiricist 
and fallibilist strain in Mill’s liberalism, the present paper offers an interpretation of 
Mill’s view that reconciles these two seemingly discordant elements in his 









J. S. Mill thinks of individuality as the most essential of human 
interests. Individuality is equivalent to freedom as meaning self-
determination – the principal condition of and main ingredient in self-
development. Accordingly, non-interference is, for him, a vital 
prerequisite of the good life: it is a fundamental presupposition of his 
liberalism that individuals should not be interfered with unless their 
activities can be shown to injure the interests of others. But in addition 
to the individualist-functionalist strain in Mill’s thought there is also a 
strong strain of skepticism and this is a fundamental component of his 
liberalism. As well as presupposing a particular view of the nature of 
man, Mill’s liberalism also rests on an empiricist view of the nature and 
possibilities of human knowledge. From this point of view, fallibilism is 




fallibilism is his conception of human nature as essentially open and 
incomplete. His doctrine of individuality and self-development, on the 
other hand, appears to imply that the individual is definable by certain 
necessary and permanent characteristics. Following a discussion of the 
empiricist and fallibilist strain in Mill’s liberalism, this paper offers an 
interpretation of Mill’s view that reconciles these two seemingly 
discordant elements in his understanding of man.  
 
 
II. Liberalism and Fallibilism 
 
Mill’s philosophy has its roots in the tradition of British empiricism 
stemming from Francis Bacon and John Locke – he believed that all 
human knowledge is derived ultimately from sensory experiences, and 
his intellectual project may be described as an attempt to construct a 
system of empirical knowledge that could underpin not just science but 
also moral and social affairs.1 Moreover, it is always possible in principle 
for new observations to upset old conclusions, or to overturn long-
established theories. Human knowledge is always fallible and always 
incomplete; hence we can never claim certainty for any theory or 
doctrine, but we may hold most firmly to those hypotheses that have 
been given the most opportunity of being questioned. “The beliefs which 
we have most warrant for,” says Mill, “have no safeguard to rest on, but 
a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them unfounded.”2 If 
the quest for absolute certainty is fruitless even in natural philosophy, 
how much more is it likely to be so in human affairs, and how much 
more necessary is it therefore that any and every doctrine be allowed the 
possibility of refutation. As Mill points out, when we turn to “morals, 
religion, politics, social relations, and the business of life, three-fourths 
of the arguments for every disputed opinion consist in dispelling the 
appearances which favour some opinion different from it.”3 
This very general theoretical belief concerning the nature of human 
knowledge is the basis of Mill’s doctrine of toleration, which is a vital 
element in his liberalism. If in the ideological sphere it is especially true 
that uncertainty reigns, then unless toleration of all doctrines and 
                                                 
1 The bulk of Mill’s theory on the foundation of human knowledge is contained in 
his System of Logic, published in six volumes in 1843.  
2 On Liberty, 1859. Edited by Currin V. Shields.  Indianapolis:  The  Bobbs-Merrill  
Co., 1956. 26.  
3 Ibid.,  44.  
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practices (short of definite injury to others) is allowed, we cannot ever 
hope to arrive at true opinions, or discover which are the best ways of 
life.  So Mill writes:  
 
“That mankind are not infallible; that their truths, for the most 
part, are only half-truths; that unity of opinion, unless resulting 
from the fullest and freest comparison of opposite opinions, is not 
desirable, and diversity not an evil, but a good, until mankind are 
much more capable than at present of recognizing all sides of the 
truth, are principles applicable to men’s modes of action, not less 
than their opinions. As it is useful that while mankind are 
imperfect there should be different opinions, so it is that there 
should be different experiments of living; that free scope should be 
given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; and that 
the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, 
when any one thinks fit to try them.”4 
 
Mill’s thesis is that men are fallible and imperfect at present (and will 
be as far as we can see into the future). We, therefore, cannot be sure 
that any doctrine is not a source of truth nor any way of living a source 
of goodness.  Hence we must allow men and women free scope to discuss 
diverse views and to try out various “experiments of living.” Unless we 
do this, many at present unforeseeable opinions and forms of human 
fulfillment will be left untried and we shall never know whether they are 
true or worthwhile.5  
Mill’s doctrine of the fallibility of human knowledge also carries with 
it an assumption concerning the nature of man: it is assumed that 
human nature is essentially indeterminate and incomplete. Since man 
himself has the continuous capacity for free choice and experiment his 
nature is, in principle, left open for development in many different and 
unpredictable directions. Since openness is an essential part of Mill’s 
concept of the individual it further follows that opaqueness is also to be 
regarded as part of man’s nature. Our knowledge of everything, 
                                                 
4 Ibid.,  68.  
5 According to Mill, free expression of opinion must always lead to the greatest 
quantity of good in the long run. But such a view appears to rest on implausible 
empirical assumptions about the utility of truth and its inevitable triumph over 
falsehood. If we set aside any such empirical claims, Mill’s position leads 
unavoidably to the invocation of non-utilitarian moral considerations about the 




including persons, is necessarily incomplete. There will always be 
something unfathomable or impenetrable about every individual. Or, 
putting the same point another way, one may take Mill to be saying that 
no individual is ever completely definable, so that the concept of man 
carries with it what might be called the notion of partial idefinability. 
This way of looking at men and women provides Mill with a powerful 
argument for toleration; if we know we can never fully understand other 
people we do well to suspend judgment, to adopt a ‘wait and see 
attitude’. Such a stance is implacably opposed to that of the fanatical 
moralist who, convinced that on the subject of human nature he has all 
the answers, is only too ready to impose his ‘solutions’ on other people.  
From his various remarks on toleration it is clear Mill meant his 
renowned infallibility argument, deployed most effectively in his 
discussion on freedom of speech, to apply to actions as well as to 
opinions. 6 As he grants when dealing with liberty of action, the state 
must act and act frequently e.g. to protect individual rights, and when it 
does so it necessarily has to act on the basis of knowledge which is far 
less than certain. With respect to freedom of speech, in particular, he at 
first takes the line that the suppression of any opinion whatsoever 
involves an assumption of infallibility. In seeking to qualify this position 
he concedes that opinions may sometimes incite people to commit 
harmful acts, which is the duty of the state to prevent. There may be a 
clear danger that the airing of an opinion will bring about some positive 
evil before there is time for the opinion to be put to the test in the forum 
of free and open discussion. Even though in such circumstances the state 
should be reasonably sure that there is a ‘clear and present danger’, once 
it has satisfied itself on this score it must intervene in order to protect 
those rights which it is one of its primary purposes to maintain.  
Whilst the infallibility argument may have to be qualified in 
particular contexts, it nevertheless remains an essential element in Mill’s 
liberalism. It is such because it establishes an initial presumption in 
favour of toleration: if the state wishes to interfere with opinions and 
actions it must be reasonably confident (i) that the activities it wishes to 
prevent are harmful and (ii) that the measures it proposes are the best 
means of preventing them. Unless it can claim reasonable assurance for 
its detailed moral and political judgments, the state is not entitled to 
intervene. The infallibility argument is seen at its strongest when 
                                                 
6 The infallibility argument that intolerance involves an unwarranted claim to 
infallible knowledge, and hence may deprive people of access to true knowledge, is 
undoubtedly Mill’s most important argument for freedom of expression and action.   
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employed against legislation aimed at enforcing morality. Mill deploys 
some particularly telling arguments designed to show how, in a number 
of different areas, the state cannot have enough rational assurance to be 
justified in protecting us for our own good. More might be said 
concerning the force of the infallibility argument in particular contexts. 
To follow up this question would, however, distract me from my task of 
trying to bring out the manner in which Mill’s skeptical attitude 
functions as one of the basic elements of his liberalism. My purpose in 
the remainder of this paper is confined to exploration of the way in 
which the fallibilist strain in Mill’s thinking is related to his doctrines of 
individuality and self-development.  
The first point requiring emphasis is that fallibilism cannot, taken by 
itself, be a sufficient foundation for Mill’s brand of liberalism. This is so 
because fallibilist liberalism is avowedly committed to the defence of one 
kind of freedom, viz. ‘negative’ freedom. To say this is not to deny that 
Mill was himself rather muddled on this particular question. There are 
times when he evidently imagines himself to be defending a purely 
negative doctrine of freedom. He is then led into the impossible attempt 
to draw a line between permissible and impermissible social controls by 
distinguishing between those actions which concern only the individual 
himself and those which concern others. On the other hand, the more 
‘positive’ side of his liberalism adds up to an extended and elaborate 
admission that skepticism on the issues of truth and moral goodness does 
not by itself constitute a sufficient foundation for liberalism. Whilst he 
never made it fully explicit, the thrust of much of Mill’s thought carries 
with it the underlying presupposition that ‘negative’ or traditional 
liberalism requires to be reinforced with a view of what activities are 
valuable in themselves and worth pursuing for their own sake. 
Accordingly, in practical contexts, Mill is to be found arguing not simply 
for the absence of interference as such, or the removal of restraints upon 
an unspecified range of activity, but for the removal of obstacles to the 
growth and expression of those positive and specific modes of thinking, 
feeling and behaving which he associates with the development of 
personality.  
Even though he remained somewhat muddled about the true 
connection between the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ aspects of liberty, Mill 
was shrewd enough to sense that negative freedom is an insufficient 
basis for liberalism. The same cannot be said of certain contemporary 
liberals, whose skepticism provides them with a normative argument for 




and appear to regard ‘negative’ freedom as sufficient foundation for 
their liberalism. The writings of Berlin and Hayek exemplify the 
predicament of such liberals. While discussing in very general terms the 
meaning and justification of freedom, they may in principle stick to 
justification via negative freedom. Detailed consideration soon shows, 
however, that they do not really wish to, or in any case in practice 
cannot, defend non-interference simply as such, i.e. the absence of 
control over some range of human activity quite unspecified. On close 
scrutiny the moral substance of their writings reveals that what they are 
actually concerned with are various concrete ways of thinking and 
acting which they deem to be of the highest moral importance.7 They 
are really bent upon defending certain particular liberties which are 
clearly related to, or even identified with, the forms of activity that they 
see as making up the good life. Berlin, for instance, stresses the positive 
value of free inquiry and Hayek emphasizes the worth of individual 
initiative and innovation. It is hard to see how their stress on the 
positive worth of these activities is compatible with a definition of 
liberty which restricts its meaning to simply the absence of coercion or 
constraint.  
Skeptical liberals, such as Hayek and Berlin, are quite right in 
insisting that the denial of certainty provides a powerful argument in 
favour of negative freedom. They go astray, though, when in discussing 
the meaning and value of freedom, they write as if they think skepticism 
alone can sustain their liberalism. Their own handling of specific 
problems involves a covert appeal to the positive worth of whatever it is 
that they want freedom for; their skepticism needs to be and is fortified 
by their invoking what they regard as important human interests or 
modes of living. 
 
 
III. Individuality and the Openness of Human Nature 
 
It remains for me to comment on what might easily be thought of as a 
discordance in Mill’s thinking about the foundations of liberalism, an 
apparent inconsistency between skepticism and his doctrine of 
individuality. On the one hand, the notions of self-development and 
individuality seem essentially to postulate for each man a distinctive 
                                                 
7  See e.g. I. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958, 55;  and 
see I. Berlin, J. S. Mill and the Ends of Life, London: The Council of Christians and 
Jews, 1959,  18 
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configuration of characteristics and powers giving him some measure of 
independence of his social milieu and environment generally. On the 
other hand, the notion of individuality (self-determination) involves, as 
I have said, notions of openness and indeterminacy, which forbid us to 
conceive of the individual in terms of any unchanging characteristics. 
Does this seeming contradiction mean that there is an incoherence right 
at the heart of Mill’s liberalism? I believe not. Let us now see how the 
apparent dilemma may be resolved. 
The problem is hinted at but left on one side by Berlin in the course 
of tracing some of the implications of Mill’s adherence to fallibilism. 
From fallibilism it follows that men are altered by discovering new 
truths and trying out new experiences so that, Berlin argues: 
 
“The notion common to Aristotelians and Christian scholastics 
and atheistical materialists alike, that there exists a basic 
knowable human nature, one and the same, at all times, in all 
places, in all men – a static, unchanging substance underneath the 
altering appearances, with permanent needs, dictated by a single, 
knowable goal, the same for all mankind, is mistaken…”8   
 
Berlin is correct in suggesting that Mill’s view of man amounts to a 
break with the picture of a determined and static human nature and the 
substitution for it of a conception of human nature as free to expand 
itself in innumerable  and  possibly   conflicting   directions.   The   
picture of man inherited by Mill from his liberal predecessors did indeed 
tacitly assume that there is such a thing as a comparatively simple and 
unalterable human nature, completely formed and fully ascertainable. 
In place of the Benthamite image of man, with its crude and over-
confident hedonism and its assumption that human nature is definable 
by a few unchanging characteristics, Mill proceeded to build up a more 
complex and open-ended picture. As has already been noted, from Mill’s 
point of view uncertainty, openness and opaqueness are part of the 
concept of man; there will always be something uncertain and 
unfathomable about every individual. 
A great deal of the zest and interest in human life does in fact arise 
out of our discovering and rediscovering that the conduct and experience 
of human beings is not congealed in some a-historical state, that it 
changes (sometimes dramatically but more often gradually) over time.  
                                                 




This part of Mill’s account of human nature is incompatible with what 
Berlin describes as the classical model of man: the conception of human 
nature as something fully understandable, fixed and certain. But whilst 
Mill’s empiricist-derived insistence that uncertainty of human nature is 
part of our concept of an individual remains incompatible with the 
classical account of man, it is not for that reason in conflict with his own 
view that man is, in part, definable by his possession of the distinctively 
human powers of mind, feeling and moral judgment. We can, while 
retaining the notion of the human species possessing certain essential 
powers, distinguish between those powers, and their particular form of 
expression within a given historical culture; in so doing room may be left 
within Mill’s concept of human nature for the notion of contingency. It 
is not being suggested for a moment that this was Mill’s own solution to 
the difficulty we have raised. There is, indeed, no evidence for his ever 
being aware of the need to try to reconcile the two apparently 
discordant elements in his picture of man. Still, the problem is one which 
his account of man’s essential powers is required to meet so there is some 
point in following up my proposed way of overcoming it. 
Stuart Hampshire, when speaking of such persisting ideas of human 
excellence, such as friendship and justice, draws an important 
distinction between these relatively unchanging abstract ideals and the 
criteria by which men in different periods and cultures have in practice 
characterized them. He writes: 
 
“A common centre of meaning, and common conditions in the 
criteria, persist with the persisting idea of that which is 
distinctively human. But the more specific conditions in the 
criteria of application of such terms as justice and friendship 
change, as the conditions of social life in which they are applied 
change.”9 
 
Mill’s model of man may be looked at once again, this time in the 
light of Hampshire’s remarks. Central in Mill’s conception of the good 
man is his individuality, his capacity for choice, and it scarcely seems 
possible that this capacity should ever be thought of as irrelevant in a 
consideration of what are the distinctive human endowments. The same 
thing might be said of those emotional and aesthetic powers which, for 
Mill, go to make up the personality of the good man; these also are 
                                                 
9  S, Hampshire, Thought and Action, London: Chatto and Windus, 1959, 1982,  
247-8. 
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among the relatively unchanging characteristics of man. If this is true, 
then it would look as if man may, in part, be defined by the possession of 
what are at least relatively unchanging characteristics. Yet while there 
are, in this sense, certain more or less permanent human powers which 
are part of the concept of man, the particular ways of thinking, feeling 
and acting, the various modes of character that are thought to give 
expression to or embody these aspects of human excellence do in fact 
change quite markedly over time. It is the existence of these latter, 
relatively impermanent and inessential forms of behaviour, in which the 
changing ideals of self-perfection are incorporated, that enables us to 
speak of the partial idefinability of human nature and so leave room in 
our concept of man for the idea of his openness and opaqueness.  
The point may be brought out more sharply if we consider the value 
Mill accords to the ideal of self-determination. Whether or not we accept 
his evaluation of it as the most important of the essential human 
interests, we should probably agree that freedom, understood in this 
very general or abstract sense, has been for a quite considerable time an 
important constituent in the liberal conception of man. It is doubtful, 
however, whether men and women in a free society care very much for 
self-determination merely as such. What some do in practice seem to 
value are rather various forms of activity or ways of life which, as it 
were, instantiate the abstract freedom of self-determination. For 
freedom of self-determination may (even within one society and at one 
time) assume a variety of different forms or modes of expression. 
Consider, for instance, Mill’s insistence on the value of participation in 
public life as a way of engaging and cultivating man’s capacity for 
reasonable judgment and deliberate choice. Men and women who do 
manage to be active in social affairs might be said to be allowing their 
powers of self-direction a particular avenue of expression, or to be 
embodying them in a concrete way of life. For them, taking an active 
share in conducting the common affairs of the community is a form of 
self-determination, is a mode of living that enables their individuality to 
flower; they do not feel free (and are not free) unless they are exercising 
their ‘political’ freedom. On the other hand, there may be other 
members of the same community who, while feeling the need to think 
and act for themselves, set little store upon participation in community 
affairs as a vehicle for the display and cultivation of their freedom. They 
may, for instance, find more scope for their realization of their active 
powers in the part of their lives given over to business, to the following 




It is in acting within the context of their various social roles that 
individuals may be said to exercise and develop their powers of self-
determination; and it is not the abstract power of self-determination but 
the exercise of their special powers of thought and self-will that they 
come to care for and to value. Mill was well aware that the ways of life 
of many men and even more women provide few opportunities for the 
display of this sort of freedom. What may be called the institutional 
structure of his liberalism is a fairly sustained effort to sketch, in 
institutional terms, the kind of society which would be required in order 
to provide the necessary setting for his ideal individual. No doubt, in 
making this attempt, he failed to consider carefully and systematically 
enough some of the difficult problems. No doubt he failed to take 
account of the complexity of the considerations to be dealt with in 
sketching the kind of political and social system within and by which 
the free life is to be realized and maintained. If I may pause to comment 
on one element in his outline of a liberal society, I should say he seems to 
have been altogether too optimistic in thinking that the majority of 
citizens in democratic nations would come to see participation in 
political and private associations as an important avenue for the 
expression and perfecting of their active powers. Yet even in making this 
observation it is necessary to sound a note of caution. The notion of 
workers’ control, for instance, is still a live political issue, or at least is 
not everywhere dead. We cannot be sure that it has no future at all. 
To sum up, we may say that an important implication of Mill’s view 
of human nature is that the individual is not definable by any 
unchanging characteristics except his unspecified but designated in a 
general sort of way powers of reason, feeling and moral judgment. 
Insofar as they are capable of exercising these powers individuals can 
achieve some measure of self-perfection. What is more, because of the 
variety of human nature and because they live in a complex society and 
one in which social conditions are subject to constant change, 
individuals may take a variety of different roads to self-perfection. 
Indeed, Mill’s individual depends, for his very being, upon the existence 
of this kind of society. It is only within a pluralistic and socially mobile 
society that individuals come gradually to be aware of their own 
identity and become capable of developing their powers or potentialities 
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